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RESUMO: A política jurídica do BRICS apresenta-se como um 
modelo paradigmático, que mostra como as teorias de Krasner e 
Keohane se complementam, graças ao uso direcionado do direito 
internacional. Este artigo pretende demonstrar que os BRICS - na 
definição de uma política jurídica inovadora e independente - 
influenciam os processos normativos, e argumenta que os BRICS 
são uma construção pós-hegemônica, com normatividade própria, 
destinada a combater a hipocrisia organizada de nosso sistema 
internacional. Tendo em vista a questão de como o BRICS participa 
da moralização do capitalismo, considerei a hipótese de uma 
hegemonia dos BRICS, no sentido de que as formas de cooperação 
promovidas pelo grupo são inovadoras e não correspondem a 
nenhum conceito atualmente em vigor. 
 
ABSTRACT: The traditional foci of international law are no longer 
the only ones that can claim hegemonic practices. Currently, the 
BRICS legal policy presents itself as a paradigmatic model, which 
shows how Krasner's and Keohane's theories complement one 
another, thanks to their targeted use of international law. This paper 
aims to demonstrate that the BRICS — in defining an innovative and 
independent legal policy — influence normativity processes, and 
argues that the BRICS are a post-hegemonic construction, with their 
own normativity, intended to fight against the organized hypocrisy 
of our international system. In view of the question of how the 
BRICS participates in the moralization of capitalism, I have 
considered the hypothesis of a BRICS hegemony, in the sense that 
the forms of cooperation promoted by the group are innovative, and 
are not corresponding to any concept currently in force 
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INTRODUCTION: THE URGE NECESSITY TO RECONSIDER HEGEMONY 
 
 
Between nationalisation and neo-colonisation, the issue of hegemony — ever since 
Gramsci — has fuelled the debate on international relations. This leads us to argue that 
international economic relations do not only derive from the guiding principles of states, nor 
are they solely determined by the dynamics of capital. Power has become a central issue, and 
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we are gradually shifting from a restrictive approach to a softer one, based on Keohane and 
Nye's model [2001]. Since the 1990s, the intelligentsia has largely questioned the state's 
deconstruction, and the decline of state-centrism has pointed towards more democratic 
governance in the 21st century [Beth, Haggard]. The United States, as the ultimate victor of 
WW2, were able to influence modern-day international relations, so as to build a form of 
hegemony tacitly accepted by all [Keylor, 2003]. So although the concept of hegemonic power 
is not, per se, necessarily malevolent, the abuse of dominant position certainly is, whether state-
based, or regional. The paradox of this undeniably multipolar projection is that, at the same 
time, the 2000s have shown the scale of international dis(order) due to all-too-long accepted 
US dominance [Gray, Craig, 2013]. Yet today, can we still assert that State and Power are 
synonymous?  
A hegemon is ontologically a guide and, as specified by Gilpin, it is supposed to ensure 
the provision of a number of goods, including access to health, because this serves its own 
interests and goals of power [Kohlmorgen, 2007]. Hegemony describes how a dominant power 
sets out the premises of a desirable order in universal terms and presents them as a system that 
benefits everyone [Kindleberger,1981]. Conversely, according to Cox, hegemony is formalised 
within a set of standards, institutions and universal procedures, which lay down the basic rules 
of behaviour applicable to states, as well as transnational social forces; sort of guiding principles 
that support the dominant mode of production. The analyses of both Gramsci and Hirschman 
reconcile these two approaches and shine a light on the BRICS reality, in so far as it addresses 
the issue of regional hegemony. However, in the face of an ever-changing international society, 
the BRICS model of alternative cooperation illustrates this new manner of developing a world 
society, away from North-South, South-South and East-West approaches or even from the 
allegedly 'universal' ones of international organisations (IOs) [Webb and Krasner, 1989].  
With the subprime crisis, IOs have undoubtedly been overwhelmed by the world 
society's intricate interdependencies and interactions and with the BRICS nations, it is the very 
perception of relations between regionalism and multilateralism that has changed radically 
[Acharya, 2004]. Although the acronym was coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001, the BRICS 
model itself only emerged five years later, through the commitment of the states concerned. 
Considered as a genuine institutional innovation, the BRICS rest upon no legal ties, and are 
rather the result of a voluntary association of states through the pooling of their interests, with 
a view to conducting balanced international trade relations. By definition, the BRICS nations 
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are not an IO and are also decidedly different from a regional organization: they are, by nature, 
geared only toward cooperation, rather than integration. As their initial financial objective was 
rapidly exceeded, the BRICS are now a sound co-operative entity, grouped around world trade 
regulatory issues, which illustrates the need of genuine counter-multilateralism to cope with 
hegemonic abuses and, more broadly, modern legal frameworks' lack of efficiency in meeting 
the emerging needs of our societies [Shraddha, 2016: Keohane and Morse, 2013]. In addition 
to the present state of international law, there is another aspect to be considered: the BRICS 
national economies have to solve a similar entanglement: Their will to be major players within 
international trade comes up against significant national health challenges. The group's four 
main members are experiencing problems related to,  
1- the health protection of their citizens in the absence of adequate funding 
mechanisms; 
2- the spread of infectious diseases;  
3- drugs.  
No doubt that the BRICS are a pioneering force: their institutional uniqueness and 
substantial innovation are redefining the governance model, but how can the BRICS 
legitimately uphold these three common issues? Their legitimacy is based on fulfilling their 
commitments, in a political sense. It is, after all, through the strength of their actions and 
decision-making that the BRICS will have a lasting impact on the world stage. The group's final 
goal remains to 'contribute to a fairer world trade' but, considering that the interplay of power 
within the WTO is almost impossible to outflank in the event of direct action, the BRICS will 
bypass the problem raised by Krasner [2004], and thus fully illustrate the counter-
multilateralism model, in the vein of Keohane's regime shifting model [Keohane and Morse, 
2013].  
The challenge of health policy compliance is therefore fundamental for the group as a 
whole, since each state has strong national interests in solving its public health issues 
[Kohlmorgen, 2007]. Incidentally, such issues are part and parcel of trade policy regulations. 
Indeed, public health concerns within world trade development have been included in the WTO 
agreements since the Uruguay Round negotiations [OMS OMC, 2002]. As a result, as much the 
TRIPS, the GATS, as some of the trade in goods agreements provide for exceptions to the 
Organisation's rules when it comes to complying with a number of health requirements. The 
WTO's interpretation of the WHO's principles is worth noting in two areas: the protection of 
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living species through the adoption of trade measures, which avoid causing them harm; and 
support for the recognition of intellectual property rights that guarantee the proper use of natural 
resources and/or the protection of said resources and species. Thus, it relates as much to a 
concern for biodiversity stricto sensu, as it does to a more technical and monetary aspect. Yet, 
the inclusion of provisions related to the protection of public health within WTO agreements 
— although 'universal' — has proved to be insufficient from 2001, at least as evidenced by the 
Doha Development Agenda. It seems, on the one hand, that the WTO's texts are too vague to 
satisfy the WHO's expectations. On the other hand, it appears that the financial and technical 
support driven by WTO-WHO institutional cooperation is more of a palliative than an offer of 
tangible aid. Against this backdrop, and guided by a substantial twofold benefit, the BRICS 
nations will define themselves as those who transform economic growth into better health 
[Pimentel, 2012]. To this end, they will first boost funding policy, combined with reinforcement 
of technology, as well as a transformative change in institutional cooperation and technical 
support. For this purpose, they will have to take action simultaneously within the WHO and the 
WTO.  
In response to Krasner's view, exclusively focused on geopolitical tensions and power 
games on the world stage, Kehoane's counter-multilateralism approach brings a solution: that 
of a genuine cooperation. Indeed, although the WHO and the WTO move towards institutional 
and legal cooperation, their commitments seem to be insufficient to meet the BRICS needs. 
Although now the traditional fora of international law are no longer the only ones that can claim 
hegemonic practices, the fact remains that the explanation delivered by international relations 
overlooks the fundamental role of law, as the custodian of the international system's 
architecture. Currently, the BRICS legal policy presents itself as a paradigmatic model, which 
shows how Krasner's and Keohane's theories complement one another thanks to their targeted 
use of international law. Given the undisputable decline of the efficiency and, by extension, the 
legitimacy of classical IOs, and considering that the BRICS, following the announcement of 
the creation of the New Development Bank in 2014, are now seen as a genuine alternative to 
existing power relations, the question then arises: how does the group achieve its original 
purpose of a 'fairer world trade' ?  
In other words, and in order to factor in a more legal analysis — unfortunately all-too-
often overlooked — one needs to determine whether there is a normativity inherent to the 
BRICS. To this end, my working assumption is that to be able to design its own normativity, 
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the group diverts the WTO's political and legal mechanisms, via the WHO's health 
requirements, and is therefore rising up as a new hegemonic formation. The BRICS will turn 
their weaknesses in the health field into an asset to permeate world trade law, by developing a 
tripartite legal policy focused on national health policy reform:  
1- set up a national health-insurance system for their citizens;  
2- fund new technologies to eradicate the most lethal infectious diseases;  
3- fight against drugs, including tobacco, through monitoring schemes and 
information campaigns.  
This paper aims to demonstrate that the BRICS — in defining an innovative and 
independent legal policy — influence normativity processes. Based on the counter-
multilateralism model, we presume that current IOs are losing their legitimacy. We will 
therefore follow the BRICS logic of opening new pathways and setting up a shift focus. We 
argue that the BRICS are a post-hegemonic construction, with their own normativity, intended 
to fight against the organized hypocrisy of our international system: soon after defining this 
sectorial pathway, the group will acquire a certain legitimacy, and, in this way, operate a shift 
focus, changing power relations within the WTO, and maybe, eventually, the Organisation's 
law [Keohane and Morse, 2013]. The group uses the vital topic of international health, and as 
a knock-on effect, has an impact on WTO law: the instrumentalization of WTO's health policies 
to curb world trade regulations seems to be the only way for the BRICS to meet their goal of a 
'fairer world trade'.  
The group will therefore divert the WTO's legal mechanisms related to public health to 
serve its own interests by addressing at once the definition and securing of their rights and, in 
doing so, by increasing their legitimacy on the world stage [Cashwell, 2014]. Indeed, while 
recognising the crucial existence of WHO and WTO, the BRICS nations are defining a 
normative framework for and by themselves, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the classical 
subjects of law and how useless they are for current international relations. The BRICS 
pathways consist of defining a threefold sectorial and legal policy modelled on the WHO's 
requirements and their own domestic interests: by using 'fuzzy law', the BRICS will strengthen 
their commitment to enshrine health policies in international trade practices (I), but it is with 
the optimisation of soft law that they will contribute to the creation of a genuine right to 
participate (II), whereby each member state may defend its interests without having to submit 
other members to their own will.  
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1 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FUZZY LAW: CONSTRUCTION OF A PRE-
NORMATIVITY BY THE BRICS ENGAGEMENT 
 
In a world dominated by the opposition between hard law / soft law, the BRICS 
inversely acts upon this duality by translating its political interest into a sort of fuzzy law. This 
concept presents itself as an alternative of quasi-legality allowing to better apprehend the 
creative dynamics of the relations between law and politics [Perez, 2015]. Fuzzy law is a proper 
legal qualification of the legal policy practices of non-subjects of international law. Kind of 
pre-soft law, the fuzzy integrates the vague and random dimension of contemporary 
international law considering the normativity of the pre-juridical acts.  
Separating itself from the strict obligation approach in order to make political law 
prevails, BRICS sets the scene for what became later the prelude of soft power and they 
elaborated the modes of its right to participate in the international system. The use of fuzzy law 
is important in our study as it helps to understand the positioning of the BRICS vis-à-vis the 
ongoing failing IOs and, more importantly, it helps to give sense to the development of its health 
policy integration strategy to world trade practices. Indeed, the BRICS lays the groundwork for 
its necessity even before the drafting of legal acts. It is therefore through its active engagement 
that the BRICS will ensure its breakthrough as an indispensable player in the renewal of 
international law. Fuzzy law, or law of elaboration, as used by BRICS, translates action into 
diplomacy, swinging between structuring at an international level (A) and acting by 
transgression on the current global order through the creation of its own global legal entities 
(B).  
 
 
 
1.A THE BRICS STRUCTURING ACTION BY ARTICULATING THE PROMOTION 
OF NATIONAL FUNDING, R&D AND CLAIMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AT AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
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The group’s structuring action is expressed by leveraging the funding of WHO policies, 
which is none other than a seed to better penetrate the WTO, and effectively and efficiently 
modify the regulation of world trade, prioritising the issue of intellectual property.  
In her speech at the first meeting of the BRICS Health Ministers, the WHO DG stated: 
"I am personally convinced that the BRICS countries are the ground on which the real impact 
of the diseases will be demonstrated. (…) I also believe that the economic cost of these diseases 
may be such that it negates the so-called benefits of modernization and economic growth." 
[http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2011/BRICS_20110711/fr/].In response, the Beijing 
declaration focused on the cardinal health-trade relationship for the Group, and clearly set out 
its ambition to fight infectious diseases. To implement this broad objective, each BRICS 
member has developed a national policy for financing research and development in the health 
sector and more specifically on the prevention aspect, thus becoming a vital vaccine producer. 
Instead of funding medicines in the strictest sense of the word, or initiating legal actions 
before the DSB, the national BRICS allegations are based on the violation of the TRIPS, and 
the BRICS States opted for a prevention policy, competing against superpowers, especially the 
United States, since the beginning: yet the bias is to have a larger production of made in BRICS 
vaccines, and, therefore, a higher number of patents for these countries [Yu, 2008; Bartsch, 
2009;]. The BRICS preventive strategy, which makes BRICS be a post-hegemonic power, is to 
divert the current institutions and not to oppose to the powers already established. In this way, 
the group ensures:   
1- a constant and consistent financial benefit and is therefore an alternative 
to the traditional mechanisms of international financing; 
2-  an increase in patent rights and therefore the assertion of its power within 
the WTO and more broadly in world trade;  
3- a certain legitimacy both on the international scene and on the part of civil 
society BRICS. 
Power games as presented by Krasner invite indeed to avoid confrontation in favour of 
cooperation. But, as Keohane emphasizes, cooperation makes sense if and only if the coalition 
of states that is behind it acts in response to a system failure. In other words, the diversion of 
the institutions in place is more advantageous than the struggle against the contemporary 
hegemonic powers, whether they are primary or derived legal subject of law. The BRICS is 
gradually becoming a necessary player in that it supports, apparently, the philosophy of the IOs. 
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Thus, as an example, if the Gate Foundation has long ensured the financing of the R & D sector, 
today, it is thanks to the proactivity of the BRICS and, de facto, the financing support of Brazil 
and India that the WHO can continue to carry out its health mission and, even more, develop 
new policies. 
The WHO, in one of its communiqués, expresses that "for investment in the prevention 
and treatment of tuberculosis in low- and middle-income countries, it is almost $ 2 billion $) 
out of the $ 8.3 billion needed in 2016. This deficit will worsen by 2020 if current levels of 
funding do not increase.”[http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/tuberculosis-
investments-short/fr/]. Since 2011, the date of the first meeting, and so far, the action and policy 
of WHO are still widely recognized and praised, as if to insist on the merits of its existence. 
The fundamental role of the Organization is constantly being recalled and, logically, the 
importance of preserving its existence and functioning as a body for the management of health 
policies is regularly reiterated. However, the BRICS also reports its commitment to continue to 
contribute to the Organization's policy or, in other words, to develop new solutions to achieve 
MDG 4 [Creswell, Jacob, 2014].In each of its statements, the group recognizes the importance 
of the UN-Nations institutions but, at the same time, stresses their limit: without the action of 
the group, how could these institutions continue to implement strategies for the eradication of 
infectious diseases? The BRICS uses a de facto situation that, in itself, is synonymous with 
vulnerability: the management of infectious diseases at the national level is impossible. It is 
then by pooling their health interests, guided by an economic ambition, that BRICS members 
succeed in reversing the interdependence - dependence on International Organizations and big 
states powers to establish themselves as the power of resolving difficulties [Kickbusch, 2014.] 
BRICS is posed to being an unwavering innovative support to aging IOs. In 2014, the 
group’s policy becomes more straightforward, more aggressive: the tone is set to no longer 
recognise the existence of the WHO but instead to affirm the strong undisputed role the group 
plays within the UN architecture. Furthermore, two events support this new policy: on the one 
hand, holding the first Meeting of the Science, Technology and Innovation Ministers committee 
that shows the will of the group to be at the forefront, thus separating itself from the 
International Organisations. On the other hand, we can see an explosion of vaccine production 
worldwide. It is by positioning itself as a non-threatening actor and by actually implementing 
WHO policies that BRICS establishes its status as a legitimate entity, bordering on the accepted 
criteria of a legal entity.  
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The Organization will acknowledge in a recent statement that "the five countries had 
taken important initiatives in the area of vaccine technology development and had greatly 
improved their national regulatory capacity (...), the results show that The BRICS group has 
had a major impact on the price and availability of vaccines, and this impact is largely 
attributable to the production of Indian vaccine manufacturers" 
[http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/tuberculosis-investments-short/fr/]. For 
the BRICS, quality seems to rhyme with quantity: in 2016, a study pointed out that Chinese 
researchers have created the first vaccine in the world against hepatitis E. From 2015, the 
BRICS will expand its field of action, setting itself up as a defender of global health crises by 
mentioning the serious concern that constitutes Ebola. Beyond the human and social aspect, 
through the recognition of its intellectual property rights, finding a vaccine against Ebola would 
ensure the BRICS a status of international financial and commercial leader. 
The structuring action of the group is the corollary of a form of normative recognition: 
the lever financing-of-the-policies-WHO is finally only a sesame to easily penetrate the forum 
of the WTO and to effectively and efficiently modify the regulation of world trade, the issue of 
intellectual property being a priority or, in a way, a pretext. By positioning itself as a non-
threatening actor and effectively implementing WHO policies, the BRICS establishes its status 
as a legitimate entity. From there, it will gradually assume a place of first choice on the 
international scene.  
 
1.B BRICS ACTION BY TRANSGRESSION THROUGH THE CREATION OF A 
GLOBAL LEGAL ENTITY 
 
The various communiqués of the BRICS Health Ministers provide three basic 
information for the development of our thesis: first, it is announced that the BRICS, in view of 
the importance of the MDGs, will actively develop the implementation of policies in these 
territories, notably through the establishment of Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Sectorial 
national politics and group policy are therefore inseparable but by managing to pool their 
interests, the BRICS states become the leader in the field of public health. Secondly, the 
commitment to respect the provisions of TRIPS is reiterated, especially with regard to the 
provisions on greater flexibility for developing and least developed countries [Odell ; Sell, 
2006]. By this second point, the BRICS presents itself as a spokesman for states in difficulty 
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or, at least, for states not integrated into the WTO. The Organization was created in a certain 
way by the action of the negotiating groups. In the Uruguay Round, the cause of developing 
countries and LDCs was mainly championed by Cairns and the ACP. Similarly, during the 
Doha Development Agenda, whether it was the C4 or the G20-WTO, the role of the negotiating 
groups was decisive on the future of the changes in the Law of the Organization [Narlikar, 
2004]. Thus, the WTO is traditionally, in a way, permeable to the actions of groups of states. 
Finally, it is more widely the action of the WTO and the WHO which is praised as regards the 
evolution of the discussions on the regulation of access to medicines. This last point then 
confirms the strong and unwavering link between trade and health, recognizing the viability of 
the BRICS health strategy to better influence the regulation of world trade [Shelepov, 2018].  
The pathways of the BRICS consists in the development of a triple sectorial legal policy 
modeled on the requirements of the WHO and on its own national interests: using the fuzzy 
law, or right of definition, the BRICS will strengthen its commitment to integrating health 
policies into international trade practices. The projection of power of the group then passes by 
the creation of normativity against the current that is to say, by the optimization of the multiple 
sources of the international law to assert its status of post-hegemonic power. Hence, it is 
disturbing to note that WTO-WHO institutional cooperation in the field of access to drugs has 
really evolved since the creation of BRICS: if in 2001, with the establishment of DDA, both 
organisations held a Symposium on price regulation in order to enhance the access of troubled 
countries to drugs, from 2013 on WIPO joined the two international organisations to further 
discuss these issues. Moreover, the different topics of the Symposia dealt with the question of 
innovation, the warhorse of BRICS [Chakraborty, 2006; Drezner, 2008, Fraser, 2014]. Beyond 
this inspiring action, the media notes of BRICS illustrate how their actions and the G20 action 
are in synergy, making the UN-Nations group a mere site for holding a meeting, as if the modes 
to achieve a legal entity should change as well [Gautier, 2014]. Somehow, it is as if BRICS 
would be trying to create a form of global legal entity playing, on the one hand, on the internal 
aspect with the multiplication of meetings in international organisations, and, on the other hand, 
on the external dimension.  
By optimizing the use of soft law through the manipulation of fuzzy law, the BRICS 
will contribute to the creation of a real right of participation, or else right of elaboration or 
definition, where each State member can defend its interests without having to submit the will 
of others. The BRICS does not constrain, it brings together. Far from the classic strategy of 
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subordination of state interests, the BRICS acts according to a dynamic of sharing interests 
while respecting the sovereignty of each. This practice ensures coherence between the 
development of a national sectorial policy and the construction of a legal policy of the group 
[Gray, 2013; Grober, 2000]. 
 
2. THE OPTIMIZATION OF SOFT LAW: POIÈSIS OF NORMATIVITY BY THE 
BRICS ACTION 
 
The WTO, before being a normative and jurisdictional body, is a forum of negotiation. 
The WHO, by the way, is also based on the negotiation - law-making mechanism. It is therefore 
by definition that these Organizations are led to use soft law, a kind of rule of attenuated 
authority describing behaviours that its author wishes to see adopted by its addressees, in order 
to coordinate the actions of [States] in society and to promote their cooperation [Chatzistavrou, 
2005]. Soft law is a different constraint from hard law and if IOs resort to this type of norms, it 
is above all to avoid jeopardizing state sovereignty [Culot, 2005]. The BRICS, by its structure, 
out of bounds of the definition of subject of law, will resort alternatively to the use of hard law 
and soft law, on the one hand, because this last type of norms assures him a certain legitimacy, 
and, secondly, because soft law, in that it is linked to soft power, makes it possible to increase 
the field of competence of the BRICS, and thus its effectiveness [Footer, 2010]. In other words, 
the BRICS will optimize the spectrum of the soft, including soft power practices, to create a 
real right of participation in which all the actors of the international society will identify to.  
BRICS, as a mere actor, is able to create a real participation and non-subordination right, 
which confers to soft law actions a real legal scope [Abbott, Snidal, 2000]. To carry out its 
legally ensured power game strategy in which each member receives an equivalent space to 
participate to the creation of the law, BRICS will contribute to reinforce the hard law ≈ soft law 
interdependence, using a soft power avenue. It is by implementing the exceptions envisaged by 
the WTO and WHO that BRICS will show that hard law requires, to come true, soft power 
infrastructures. The actions of BRICS concerning the law, given that it is a simple 
implementation of conventional dispositions, illustrate that hard law and soft power (A) 
complement each other, and the soft power ≡ soft law progression is illustrated through the 
orientation of the WTO judicial policy by means of the WHO sectorial policy (B).  
 
 
 
194 
 
2.A THE HARD LAW ≡ SOFT POWER COMBINATION: THE BRICS ACTION 
CONCERNING THE LAW, A SIMPLE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTIONAL 
DISPOSITIONS THROUGH THE SURVEILLANCE CENTRE  
 
In WTO law, both the Agreements on Trade in Goods, the TRIPS and the GATS contain 
explicit exceptions to the liberal requirements of the Organization [Gauthier, 2014]. In other 
words, trade barriers are acceptable practices to the extent that they are intended to protect the 
consumer and that their merits are scientifically verified. Unlike the hard law provisions of 
WTO law, which consists of derogations from the Organization's guiding principles, a kind of 
an a contrario obligation, those of the WHO Framework Convention consist of principles to be 
respected [OMS-OMC Accords]. Thus, hard law can take two forms: principles to be followed 
or exceptions to be respected, depending on whether one is in the sphere of WHO, whose object 
relates to public health, or the WTO, whose business purpose must take into account public 
health requirements. Given the same objective, the two Organizations therefore employ 
different aspects that are complementary to this type of normativity but far from participating 
in an effective and adequate application of these principles, this variation in the drafting of 
conventional standards further hampers the possibilities of guaranteeing their respect 
[Kolmorgen; Krasner]. From this WTO-WHO cooperation and this game principle-exceptions, 
it would seem that hard law is necessary and sufficient to guarantee the international order. 
Yet, and this is precisely what was illustrated in the case DS26: EC-Hormones, where, 
by appealing to the Codex, the EU has clearly highlighted the limits of hard law. At the same 
time, it is the suppletive and yet essential dimension of soft law that has been focused on. 
Moreover, by this mention, it is the importance of the consensus mechanism that has been 
devoted, conferring, with strong anticipation, the added value of a governance orchestrated far 
from the institutional rigidity of the post-WWII system. In other words, this claim is a form of 
affirmation of the need to resort to soft law standards but also to soft power mechanisms.  
Considering, on the one hand, that Brazil is the third largest tobacco producer and 
exporter country, only after China and India and ahead of Russia, and, on the other hand, that 
FIOCRUZ will take the initiative in this regard, the tobacco issue is of utmost importance for 
the creation of the legal and political strategies of the group [Thorstensen, 2012]. Because the 
BRICS nations will finally allow for the implementation of WTO and WHO conventional 
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norms, the integration of health policies in the world’s trade law is meaningful and active. 
During the October 2015 meeting held in Moscow, the BRICS Health Ministers, in order to 
materialise the Article 5.3. of the WHO Framework Convention, and to enforce the decision 
FTC/COP3(7) of 2008, decided to establish, in their respective territories, Surveillance Centres 
or Observatories for the tobacco industry, so that measures can be taken to limit the launching 
and the proliferation of this kind of products. The first of the five BRICS nations to be actually 
engaged was Brazil, with the creation of FIOCRUZ in 2016, whose initiative was largely 
welcomed by the DG of the WHO.  
A great part of FIOCRUZ action is to come up with judicial policies aimed to counter 
the action of certain nations that are heavily dependent on the tobacco industry. The Centre has, 
thus, elaborated a policy including judicial decisions, and is poised to confirm that, oftentimes 
when a national lawsuit takes place, States use the WHO Framework Convention as an excuse 
in order to dismiss the allegations of the industries. Apart from playing a simple influential role, 
BRICS greatly contributes to the international architecture from an institutional point of view: 
due to its intervention, it is considered both autonomous and proactive a group. BRICS responds 
to the conventional dispositions of the International Organisations because of a practical need: 
facing hard law that is often considered vital, and soft law envisaged as a necessary mode to 
enforce conventional law, it seems that BRICS has opted again for the third way, using soft 
power as a transition between these two aspects of the normativity. 
 
2.B The soft power ≡ soft law progression: orienting the WTO judicial policy by using the 
WHO sectorial policy in a BRICS fashion  
 
Rather than opting for the median jurisdictional confrontation of the DSB, the BRICS 
prefers an approach of misappropriation of legal mechanisms in the strict sense of the term. The 
members of the group will play the subtle nuance between will and interests, constituting a third 
party in certain disputes of the DSB, thus giving substance to their strategy of creating a real 
right of participation. Indeed, if, because it is not a subject of law, the participation of the BRICS 
as such in the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO is impossible, it remains that its 
participation fragmented, in the strict framework posed by third-party status, constitutes a 
means of action. The creation of supervisory bodies for the tobacco industry thus constitutes a 
bridge between hard law, with undeniable obligation, and soft law, which is illustrated by the 
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various communications and documents published by the BRICS with a view to notify his will. 
This institutional gateway is in itself an action of soft power, focused both on the 
implementation of the provisions of hard law and a directed use of soft law acts. 
By the creation of FIOCRUZ, in Brazil, after the meeting of ministers of health in 
Moscow, the issue of tobacco and related industrial policies, because they threaten compliance 
with Article 5.3. of the WHO Convention, constitute the basis for the development of a WTO-
oriented judicial policy [Ricupero, 2012]. In 2010, a few years before the creation of FIOCRUZ, 
the Clove Cigarettes dispute between the United States and Indonesia opened. Brazil reserved 
its third-party rights as soon as the panel was formed. By that time, he was the only BRICS 
country to have come forward. Its jurisdictional approach can not then be interpreted as a 
guarantee of an informal representativeness of the interests of the group, but only as the 
expression of own state interests; of his will. Considering, on the other hand, that Brazil is the 
third largest producer and exporter of tobacco after China and India, and before Russia, and on 
the other hand, that it will be the initiative FIOCRUZ, the tobacco issue is of considerable 
importance in the elaboration of the group's legal, political and health strategies. If the BRICS 
has been directly involved in setting WHO's sectorial policy, it may be that, as a decisive player 
in the tobacco market, the practice of policy control industrialists in this field would help them 
gain legitimacy: by integrating and implementing WHO's health policy, the Group stands as an 
example to be followed, and not as a threat, thus damaging the pioneering hegemonic in place. 
Where Krasner saw irreducible tensions power games, soft device by Keohane and Nye 
can understand that if the BRICS manages to win, it is by diverting the mechanisms of struggle: 
the law is no longer useful from now on to guarantee the application of the norms but it serves 
to legitimize new geopolitical behaviours. In 2010, i.e. some years before the creation of 
FIOCRUZ, the Clove Cigarettes Dispute between the United States and Indonesia took place. 
Brazil has reserved its rights as a third party ever since the special group was set up. At that 
time, it was the only BRICS country to have spoken out. Its jurisdictional approach cannot be 
interpreted as a token of an informal representation of the group’s interests, but only as an 
expression of its own interests. After the creation of FIOCRUZ, as the tobacco issues and the 
related industrial policies might threaten the enforcement of Article 5.3. of the WHO 
Convention, they become the basis of the development of a judicial policy implemented within 
the WTO framework, given that BRICS prefers a diversion of jurisdictional mechanisms.  
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The most flagrant case of manipulation of judicial policies has recently been illustrated 
with Australia. In 2011, the country adopted a plain packaging law; the reaction of Imperial 
Tobacco Australia, British American Tobacco Australia and Philip Morris Limited was not long 
in coming and in 2012 Australia had to answer for its legislation in a national court. More 
surprisingly, the WTO has had to decide on the legal-political consequences of this national 
dispute: since 2012, 5 complaints have been lodged against Australia with the OSD on the 
grounds that its legislation violates Articles 1, 1: 1, 2: 1, 3: 1, 15, 16, 20 and 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the WTO treaty provisions 
recognizing public health as a fundamental element in the development of world trade law. 
Even more surprisingly, Brazil, Russia, India and China constituted third parties in the said 
disputes and yet only Brazil presented its arguments only in the context of DS 434 and 458, 
arguing in the one and the other case that "in order to meet the substantive requirements of 
Article 6.2 of the DSU, the request for the establishment of a panel must identify the measures 
targeted in the dispute and contain a brief summary of the legal basis of the claims + add on the 
reasoning of the parties "(DS434 - 15, §3.21 & 458-18, §3.23)" 
The concordance between the opening of the consultations of these disputes with the 
WTO, the reservation of the rights of the third parties of the BRICS, the decision of the 
Australian judge, and the creation of the FIOCRUZ enjoins to conclude to a strategy of judicial 
policy on the part BRICS. By acting as guarantor of the FIOCRUZ program and by becoming 
a third party in disputes relating to the tobacco issue, the BRICS - the median manifestation of 
Brazil - ensures the implementation of the WHO Framework Convention within the World 
Health Organization. WTO. Indeed, although the rights of third parties are limited by its 
argument, Brazil makes it clear that its objective is to ensure the continued existence of 
FIOCRUZ, the OSD being used as a judicial mechanism to guarantee the project. Thus, the 
WHO-linked soft power structure FIOCRUZ provides the basis for Brazil's soft law claims 
under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: TO MAKE CAPITALISM MORAL: THE ONGOING ACTION OF 
THE BRICS: AN HEGEMON OPERATIONIS   
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If the legal subjects of international law are no longer the only ones capable of claiming 
an hegemonic practice, the fact remains that, in order to form the basis of a paradigmatic 
reflection on the future of the BRICS, this must be accompanied by a legal approach. However, 
this aspect has often been abandoned in favor of a strictly political analysis of the group's action. 
While it is undeniable that the BRICS is revolutionizing governance through the redefinition of 
the fundamental concept of power, it is in international law that its impact is most striking, as 
the group acts as a catalyst of normativity. The creation of soft power structures ensures the 
implementation of hard law, which enables to guarantee the scope of the group’s soft law 
actions. Likewise, BRICS challenge IOs efficiency: it highlights their inability to also use soft 
power to ensure the enforcement of its own conventional regulations. Using this strategy BRICS 
becomes a necessary actor for the survival of IOs and, paradoxically, the biggest threat for their 
future. Thus, in view of the question of how the BRICS participates in the moralization of 
capitalism, I have considered the hypothesis of a BRICS new form of hegemony, in the sense 
that the forms of cooperation promoted by the group are innovative and not corresponding to 
any concept currently in force while the coalition is dominating, step by step, the current global 
order. BRICS presents itself as a guide to the international society, but at the same time each 
member insists on maintaining control over its national resources and the area of the world that 
it actually dominates. 
BRICS made a genuine redefinition of the fundamental concept of power which 
revolutionized governance [Aldrighi, 2009; Borba Casela, 2011]. Since then, power is defined 
through the triptych: financial sovereignty - strong and solid technological development - sectorial 
economy. BRICS practice also leads to a redefinition of power plays [Hurrel, 2009]. So if 
statocentrism is no longer current, it is a fact, however, that the role of the state remains central: it 
was only the definition of the state that changed, insofar as it is now exclusively linked to that of 
capitalism. Since the subprime crisis, it has been about making capitalism moral, clean and 
transparent. Now, considering that this is the new objective of the international society, this means 
that until then capitalism was dirty, obscure and immoral. Beyond the redefinition of forms of 
governance, BRICS cooperation therefore forms part of a new era; an era dedicated to the 
purification of capitalism. And if the challenge seems to be of marxist inspiration, it is not, 
however, incompatible with today's neoliberal practice: ambition is, in effect, to convert capitalism 
into morality. It is not about destroying it but all purity is cruelty, and in the present case purifying 
capitalism would be to suppress the mechanism of surplus value. The BRICS tries to respond to 
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the demand to cleanse capitalism. Neoliberalism is moving towards the end and the hypotheses of 
post-hegemony are only partially illuminating. BRICS cooperation presents itself as the 3rd long 
awaited path: far from neoliberalism and socialism, the BRICS incarnates the original will that 
animated the creators of this famous "third world". Because, in fact, at the beginning of the Cold 
War, the Third World was not the expression of a stigmatization, reflecting rather the will to create 
an alternative to the two blocs. The third world was, therefore, the incarnation of the third possible 
way. To think of the BRICS, which has questioned the whole architecture of the international 
society since WWII, is, therefore, to think of the exit of an East-West / North-South sclerosing 
opposition.  
By recognizing the fundamental existence of classical IOs but by substituting their 
normative framework by its own, the BRICS demonstrates their inefficiency. There is therefore 
a BRICS normativity built on a triple logic interpretation - explanation - modification of the 
law in order to ensure its domination of the political game. The law is no longer a guarantee of 
the current world order: it becomes an instrument at the service of a real and deep change. 
Although the BRICS was initially formed with a view to ensuring "a fairer world trade", the 
expansion of its scope has continued since the Iecaterina and Fortaleza Summits, making the 
question of the regulation of health policies an influencing tool and /or argument to curb WTO 
Law. It is by misappropriating the median WTO law that BRICS succeeds in redefining 
normativity. In response to the ontological legal crisis, classical IOs are the most endangered 
and tend to be imperialistic, going beyond the original function of the hegemon-guide- to make 
it a hegemon-dominus.  
By proposing alternatives of governance oriented using health policies and making 
innovative use of WTO law, the BRICS revives with the first conception of the hegemon, a 
guide working for the common good, without losing sight of the realization of its own interests. 
Highlighting the complementarity between the approaches of Keohane and Krasner, we can 
thus consider that the counter-multilateralism of Keohane, in that he interprets the mechanisms 
of state coalition as consubstantial to the realization of a true cooperation, brings a track of 
answer to the vision of Krasner, which consists of an explanation of the state of the median 
international relations the power games. The BRICS have made their state weakness a decisive 
asset and although the legality of the instruments used is questionable, the fact remains that 
their use allows the group to upset the criteria of normativity accepted until then. So, because 
BRICS assertion of hegemonic power involves cooperation, and to mark the semantic 
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difference from the overly connoted concept of hegemon, we propose to now call the BRICS 
Hegemon Operationis, posing the hypothesis that this new form of regulating international 
relations would be the way to make capitalism moral.  
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